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Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial Critique
GURMINDER K. BHAMBRA
MODERNITY IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS of sociology, with sociology itself fre-
quently understood as emerging as a modern form of reﬂection upon associated
historical processes.1 The sociological understanding of modernity typically rests on
ideas of the modern world emerging out of the processes of economic and political
revolution located in Europe and underpinned by the cultural changes brought about
by the Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientiﬁc Revolution. Such an understanding
conﬂates Europe with modernity and renders the process of becoming modern, at
least in the ﬁrst instance, one of endogenous European development. Coterminous
with this argument is the idea that the rest of the world was external to these world-
historical processes and that colonial connections and processes were insigniﬁcant
to their development.
While historical accounts of the two revolutions—and, by implication, of mo-
dernity itself—have not remained unchanged over time, what has remained constant
has been the historiographical frame—of autonomous endogenous origins and sub-
sequent global diffusion—within which these events are located. This frame, or
grand narrative, is Eurocentric in character, and it is this which remains in place even
when the particular histories within it are contested. Not only have “others” not been
recognized as constitutive of the canonical “twin revolutions,” but the potential con-
tribution of other events (and the experiences of non-Western “others”) to the his-
torical-sociological paradigm has rarely been considered. As Steven Seidman re-
marks, sociology’s emergence coincided with the high point of Western imperialism,
and yet “the dynamics of empire were not incorporated into the basic categories,
models of explanation, and narratives of social development of the classical soci-
ologists.”2
This has begun to shift somewhat in the light of postmodernist and poststruc-
turalist claims. Since the 1960s and 1970s, knowledge claims in the social sciences
and humanities have been under pressure from the rise of subaltern positions and
an explicitly recognized politics of knowledge production that has questioned the
I would like to thank Mia Rodriguez-Salgado, David Arnold, John Holmwood, and the AHR ’s anon-
ymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1 The detailed demonstration of the arguments in the ﬁrst two paragraphs is contained in Gurminder
K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination (Basingstoke, 2007).
2 Steven Seidman, “Empire and Knowledge: More Troubles, New Opportunities for Sociology,”
Contemporary Sociology 25, no. 3 (1996): 313–316; see also Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Sociology and
Postcolonialism: Another ‘Missing’ Revolution?” Sociology 41, no. 5 (2007): 871–884.
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possibility of objective knowledge.3 This pressure has been expressed in terms of
suspicion toward positivist explanatory paradigms and their presumed associations
with power, with a shift from causal explanation to reﬂexivity, deconstruction, and
interpretation, and with arguments for the necessary demise of grand narratives.
Postcolonial scholarship has similarly been integral to the opening out and ques-
tioning of the assumptions of the dominant discourses.4 If we now understand dom-
inant approaches as Eurocentric, it is because of new voices emerging in wider po-
litical arenas and in the academy itself. The end of colonialism as an explicit political
formation has given rise to understandings of postcoloniality and, perhaps ironically,
an increased recognition of the role that colonialism played in the formation of mo-
dernity. These developments, associated generally with “the cultural turn,” have pro-
voked a paradigm shift within many disciplines in the social sciences and in the hu-
manities more generally. Within sociology, the cultural turn, in relation to
understandings of modernity, is manifest in two broad approaches: third wave cul-
tural historical sociology and the multiple modernities paradigm.
Third wave cultural historical sociology is deﬁned by its attempts to historicize
understandings of modernity, that is, to examine the diverse, complex histories that
are regarded as embodying and constituting modern transformations.5 There is an
explicit move away from earlier forms of historical sociology, which were concerned
with issues of causal explanation, to, as Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann
Shola Orloff suggest, a more “genealogical” project “associated with the formation
of historically evolving cultural categories and practices.”6 In this way, third wave
cultural historical sociology merges with cultural history. It offers up a diversity of
now-disaggregated histories in which Eurocentric history is decentered, but the more
difﬁcult issues associated with the grand narratives of (European) modernity are not
addressed. This leaves the standard narrative of modernity intact as the implicit
grand narrative within which these disaggregated histories are necessarily located.
The multiple modernities paradigm similarly emerges from a context in which the
pressure to include other histories can no longer be avoided. Unlike third wave cul-
tural historical sociology, this paradigm does address the grand narrative of mo-
dernity, but it hardly reconstructs it.
Multiple modernities emerged as a distinct research paradigm in the late 1990s.7
3 See John Holmwood, “Sociology and Its Audience(s): Changing Perceptions of Sociological Ar-
gument,” in John Eldridge, John MacInnes, Sue Scott, Chris Warhurst, and Anne Witz, eds., For So-
ciology: Legacies and Prospects (Durham, N.C., 2000), 33–55; and George Steinmetz, ed., The Politics
of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others (Durham, N.C., 2005).
4 See, among others, Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, 1994); Edward W. Said,
Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London, 1978); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the
Subaltern Speak?” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of
Culture (Chicago, 1988), 271–313; Spivak, “Post-structuralism, Marginality, Postcoloniality and Value,”
in Peter Collier and Helga Geyer-Ryan, eds., Literary Theory Today (Cambridge, 1990), 219–244; Gyan
Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism,” American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (December
1994): 1475–1490.
5 See, for example, Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff, eds., Remaking Mo-
dernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, N.C., 2005); and Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt,
eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley, Calif., 1999).
6 Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff, “Introduction: Social Theory, Mo-
dernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology,” in Adams, Clemens, and Orloff, Remaking Mo-
dernity, 43.
7 It was developed by both historians and sociologists, and its particular theoretical exposition was
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The failures of earlier modernization theory were deemed to be self-evident by this
time—with limited convergence and homogenization apparent in the world—and
modernization theory had also been under attack, largely by Third World theorists
of development and underdevelopment. In differentiating multiple modernities
from modernization theory, scholars argued that two fallacies, in particular, were to
be avoided. The ﬁrst is that there is only one modernity, and the second is that
looking from West to East necessarily constitutes a form of Eurocentrism.8 The ar-
gument being put forward is that while the idea of one modernity, especially one that
has already been achieved in Europe, would be Eurocentric, theories of multiple
modernities must nonetheless take Europe as the reference point in their exami-
nation of alternative modernities.9 Theorists of multiple modernities, in defending
the dominant approach to comparative historical sociology, accept that Eurocen-
trism has been a problem that has sometimes distorted the way in which modernity
has been conceived, yet they also argue that Eurocentrism cannot be denied as “fact,”
that, put simply, the European origins of modernity cannot be denied. However, it
is precisely this “fact” that is denied when global interconnections are recognized.10
Theorists of multiple modernities sidestep the issue of global interconnections
by theorizing modernity as being constituted by institutional frameworks operating
together with cultural codes. This division enables the former to be understood as
that which is common across the varieties of modernity—and thus allows all types
of modernity to be understood as such—while the latter, being the location of crucial
antinomies, provides the basis for variability, and thus multiples of a common mo-
dernity. By maintaining a general framework within which particularities are locat-
ed—and identifying the particularities with culture and the experience of Europe
with the derivation of the general framework itself—theorists of multiple moder-
nities have, in effect, neutralized any challenge that a consideration of other histories
could have posed.11 Thus theorists of multiple modernities seek to contain challenges
to the dominant theoretical framework of sociology by not allowing “difference” to
make a difference to the original categories of modernity.
Simply pluralizing the cultural forms of modernity, or recognizing the histories
of others, does nothing to address the fundamental problems with the conceptual-
ization of modernity itself, a conceptualization that remains intact in third wave
cultural historical sociology as well as in the approach of multiple modernities.
undertaken by Shmuel Eisenstadt in conjunction with a core group of European historical sociologists.
Eisenstadt held the unique position of having been a key theorist in the elaboration of modernization
theory in the 1960s and was now central to its rethinking as a theory of multiple modernities. See S. N.
Eisenstadt, “Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization,” American So-
ciological Review 30, no. 5 (1965): 659–673; Early Modernities, Special Issue, Daedalus 127, no. 3 (1998),
including Shmuel N. Eisenstadt andWolfgang Schluchter, “Introduction: Paths to EarlyModernities—A
Comparative View,” 1–18; and Multiple Modernities, Special Issue, Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000).
8 Eisenstadt and Schluchter, “Introduction.”
9 Ibid., 2.
10 See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconﬁguration of Early Mod-
ern Eurasia,” The Eurasian Context of the Early Modern History of Mainland South East Asia, Special
Issue, Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1997): 735–762; Tarak Barkawi, “Connection and Constitution:
Locating War and Culture in Globalization Studies,” Globalizations 1, no. 2 (2004): 155–170; Bhambra,
Rethinking Modernity.
11 Arif Dirlik, “Global Modernity? Modernity in an Age of Global Capitalism,” European Journal of
Social Theory 6, no. 3 (2003): 275–292; Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity.
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Within the discipline of history, the response to these paradigmatic shifts in the wider
academy is, in this ﬁrst instance, different. However, there are also crucial similar-
ities with the developments in sociology—similarities that provoke a reconsideration
of the relationship between sociology and history.
POSTMODERN CRITIQUES HAVE HAD most effect in those disciplines that orient ex-
plicitly to the notion of temporal and spatial rupture contained within understand-
ings of modernity, and indeed could be argued to be structured by such understand-
ings. Both sociology and anthropology, for example, conventionally locate their
object of study on either side of the tradition-modernity divide and, with the collapse
of grand narratives and the assumed dissolution of this divide, have been beset by
legitimation crises around the constitution of their object of study.12 History has
managed to avoid such a crisis, in part because there has been no disciplinary im-
perative to locate its object of study on one side or the other of this divide. History
takes as its object the entirety of the past and has responded to postmodern crit-
icisms, in the main, by expanding the remit of the “particularities” it admits.13 The
proliferation of studies beyond the traditional histories of states and monarchs began
in the 1960s and 1970s with the turn to social, feminist, and subaltern histories, and
the discipline did not require much persuasion then to include cultural and post-
colonial histories.14 That this proliferation has not led to the same kind of frag-
mentation or internal division found within sociology and, to a lesser extent, an-
thropology can be attributed to its coalescence around the idea of historical method.
History, for many, is a form of scholarly engagement that brings historical evidence
and material to bear upon interpretations such that even where those interpretations
may be contested, interlocutors can ﬁnd value in the new evidence that is brought
to light. Georg Iggers refers to this as an “expanded pluralism” in which new histories
may jostle for space on the curriculum, but they do not necessarily represent them-
selves as posing a methodological challenge to the dominant mode of scholarly in-
quiry as such.15 As a consequence, the collapse of grand narratives, and the turn to
cultural history, is more easily absorbed by a discipline that is ecumenical in terms
of how it constructs, and locates, its object of study.
The cultural turn in history, then, has given rise to two seemingly paradoxical
manifestations. One is the turn to microhistories, and the other is the turn to global
history.16 While the former, with its rejection of grand narratives and its focus on
12 For further discussion of disciplinary cultures, see Miche`le Lamont, How Professors Think: Inside
the Curious World of Academic Judgment (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 53–106.
13 Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientiﬁc Objectivity to the Post-
modern Challenge (Middletown, Conn., 1997); Lamont, How Professors Think.
14 Early examples include E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963);
Louise A. Tilly and Joan W. Scott, Women, Work and Family (1978; repr., New York, 1987); and Ranajit
Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society (Delhi, 1982). For a discussion
of some of the historiographical debates surrounding such shifts in the focus of the historical enterprise,
see M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado, “Dust and Ashes: The History of Politics and War,” in John A. Marino,
ed.,Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of Braudel’s Mediterranean (Kirksville,
Mo., 2002), 145–168.
15 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, 144.
16 See Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It,” trans. John
Tedeschi and Anne C. Tedeschi, Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1993): 10–35; David Northrup, “Globalization
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cultural phenomena, ﬁts easily within any characterization of the cultural turn, global
history would appear to be at odds with it. To the extent that global history takes
seriously the injunction to consider “others” in its elaboration of the global—spe-
ciﬁcally postcolonial others—the inﬂuence of the cultural turn can be recognized.17
In this sense, microhistories (with their discovery of new, previously obscure, events
in places already studied) and global histories (with their discovery of new, previously
obscure, histories of other places) can be seen to have similar characteristics. And
it is this characteristic of identifying “the new,” without reconstructing the “old”
paradigms within which these new histories are to be located, that is of concern here.
Given that historians do not necessarily have to take a position with regard to
grand narratives within standard practices of “history-making,” then, in the context
of microhistories it is easier still to sidestep any contentious issues arising from the
cultural turn more generally. These microhistories present the historical endeavor
in terms of recovering history, and cultural meaning, from the fragmentary and the
previously obscure, and in so doing they often adapt anthropological methods to
historical research.18 Criticisms of positivism, of the oppression of explanations, of
the silencing of other voices—all can be avoided by refusing to explain, by simply
deconstructing and interpreting. While they may explicitly eschew grand narratives,
this does not mean that their research exists outside of such narratives. As Barbara
Weinstein demonstrates in her consideration of three cultural histories, they are
rarely able to discard an underlying explanatory framework in the presentation of
their research.19 What occurs, she suggests, is that the grand narrative is so thor-
oughly embedded in the cultural frameworks within which historians operate that it
no longer even requires explicit acknowledgment; it is present, instead, “as the his-
torian’s ‘common sense.’ ”20 This “commonsensical” narrative is also at play within
global history, with the standard understanding of modernity, as emerging endog-
enously in Europe and subsequently diffusing across the globe, central to framing
research in this area.
The cultural turn, and postcolonial critique more speciﬁcally, prompted histo-
rians to engage more thoroughly with parts of the world beyond Europe and the
West. This was manifest in developments associated with the rise of world history
and in the subsequent new global history. One dominant strand of world history, as
David Christian argues, has been the attempt to construct a singular history of the
and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World History in the Long Term,” Journal of World History 16,
no. 3 (2005): 249–267; and Barbara Weinstein, “History without a Cause? Grand Narratives, World
History, and the Postcolonial Dilemma,” International Review of Social History 50 (2005): 71–93.
17 This is especially so in the context of teaching; in the U.S., there has been increased discussion
of the general “Western Civilization” course and an attempt to broaden its parameters by, in some places,
transforming it into “World History.” For discussion, see Gilbert Allardyce, “Towards World History:
American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course,” Journal of World History 1, no. 1
(1990): 23–76.
18 Weinstein, “History without a Cause,” 74–75; see also Ginzburg, “Microhistory”; and Andrew
Willford and Eric Tagliacozzo, eds., Clio/Anthropos: Exploring the Boundaries between History and An-
thropology (Stanford, Calif., 2009).
19 Weinstein, “History without a Cause,” 75–78. Richard Biernacki makes a similar point when he
writes that even Clifford Geertz, a key source for the cultural turn, could not avoid making “seemingly
‘causal’ claims about the way culture works”; Biernacki, “Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural
History,” in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 72.
20 Weinstein, “History without a Cause,” 77.
Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial Critique 5
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 2011
world that is more than simply “a collection of the particular stories of different
communities.”21 Beyond an encyclopedic endeavor to document all the histories of
peoples in the world, what is needed is a particular narrative to bring these histories
within a coherent structure. The issue in this conception is less about discovering new
histories about others, more about ordering them. As William H. McNeill wrote in
the inaugural issue of the Journal of World History, “Data exist; what is needed is to
gather and bring them to order and then construct a clear and elegant discourse with
which to present the different facets and interacting ﬂows of human history as we
now understand them.”22 The discourse in this case is, quite explicitly, the rise of the
West. This, incidentally, is also the title of McNeill’s 1963 magnum opus, upon which
he was reﬂecting “after twenty-ﬁve years,” and in his consideration of the earlier
claims, he wrote that while his personal idiosyncrasies may have led him to look at
“history from the point of view of the winners,” we must nonetheless acknowledge
that point of view and “admire those who pioneered the enterprise and treat the
human adventure on earth as an amazing success story, despite all the suffering
entailed.”23 Questions of who this “we” consists of, and whether “we” must celebrate
the successes (of some) despite the suffering (of others), formed the nub of post-
colonial, and other, criticisms.
A structuring arc was believed to be necessary in world history in order to give
coherence to what otherwise would have been simply a collection of particular his-
tories, but it was not clear what that structuring arc could be, except for some version
of the “rise of the West” grand narrative. Other suggestions, such as “the evolution
of freedom” or “modernization,” were similarly regarded as problematic because of
their construction of world history as the offspring of European/Western civiliza-
tion.24 One alternative, posed by Andre Gunder Frank, was for a history that would
be structured around “the world system and the historical process of its develop-
ment.”25 To the extent that “development” was generally considered in terms of
expansion outward from an initial transformation, that of feudal Europe into a cap-
italist world economy, world-systems theory can be understood as following the usual
trajectory of Europe to the world, which is regarded as problematic. Further, its
emphasis on economic structures made it difﬁcult to accommodate “culture” within
its analyses or to recognize that “others” had a history prior to European incur-
sions.26
With the identiﬁcation of a singular narrative being regarded as problematic for
a variety of reasons but the criticisms of a descent into simple fragmentation holding,
there was a call in the mid-nineties by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright for some-
thing different. They argued that world history needed to recognize that it operated
21 David Christian, “World History in Context,” Journal of World History 14, no. 4 (2003): 438.
22 William H. McNeill, “The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years,” Journal of World History 1,
no. 1 (1990): 20–21.
23 Ibid., 3.
24 See Allardyce, “Towards World History.”
25 Andre Gunder Frank, “A Plea for World System History,” Journal of World History 2, no. 1 (1991):
6; see also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974) and The Modern World-System
II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750 (New York, 1980).
26 See Lauren Benton, “From theWorld-Systems Perspective to Institutional World History: Culture
and Economy in Global Theory,” Journal of World History 7, no. 2 (1996): 261–295.
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in “an age of globality” and to work to recover the “multiplicity of the world’s pasts”
in order to make sense of the new processes of “global integration and local dif-
ferentiation” associated with globalization.27 With this, they mirrored the shift in
sociology with critiques of modernization theory, prompting the move to a concep-
tion of multiple modernities. Indeed, they argued that world history needed to be
structured around the conception of “an integrated world of multiple and multi-
plying modernities,” which required “critical reﬂection and historical study.”28 An
important development in the studies that followed was a reconsideration of the “rise
of the West” narrative to take into account local dynamics elsewhere.29 These his-
tories often established similarities in economic conditions globally and offered con-
vincing alternatives to the standard explanations rooted in notions of European
uniqueness. Gale Stokes suggests that this new scholarship has attempted to sidestep
the older controversies associated with the question of “why Europe?” to address
questions of polycentric interactions and material advances through comparative
history on a global scale.30 While these histories have, for the most part, moved away
from evaluating the break in terms of a civilizational imperative, to the extent that
they continue to frame their discussions in terms of responding to a break or rupture
that requires explanation in its own terms, the question of “why Europe?” remains
implicit in their analyses. The trail laid by Max Weber in seeking to determine the
causes of the miracle of Europe has been adapted by subsequent scholars attempting
to account for the miracle in Europe.
World history has been supplemented (or contested?) in recent years by the
emergence of the new global history, which takes institutional expression in the Jour-
nal of Global History, established in 2006. There is little consensus on what, precisely,
constitutes global history as distinct from world history, and many scholars regard
it as a variant of, or even a synonym for, world history, while others believe it to be
completely antithetical to it.31 My concern here is not with this debate. The aim of
the new journal, in the words of its editors, is to subject processes of globalization,
contemporary and longstanding, to “more historical treatment.”32 Global history, for
27 Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “World History in a Global Age,” American Historical Review
100, no. 4 (October 1995): 1042, 1058.
28 Ibid., 1058.
29 See, for example, R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European
Experience (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Mak-
ing of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Jack A. Goldstone, “Efﬂorescences and Eco-
nomic Growth in World History: Rethinking the ‘Rise of the West’ and the Industrial Revolution,”
Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (2002): 323–389; Maxine Berg, “In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History
and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 182, no. 1 (February 2004):
85–142; Raymond Grew, “Review Article: Expanding Worlds of World History,” Journal of Modern
History 78, no. 4 (2006): 878–898.
30 Gale Stokes, “The Fates of Human Societies: A Review of Recent Macrohistories,” American
Historical Review 106, no. 2 (April 2001): 508–525. Goldstone, for example, suggests that “there is no
universal or European ‘modernity’ for the world to adopt or combat; rather there is a particular strand
in European culture, engine science,” that other cultures have adopted, and adapted, to a greater or
lesser degree. This is then presented as constituting the multiplicity of modernities that are present in
the world. Goldstone, “Efﬂorescences and Economic Growth in World History,” 376.
31 For debate, see Bruce Mazlish, “Comparing Global History to World History,” Journal of Inter-
disciplinary History 28, no. 3 (1998): 385–395; Maxine Berg, “From Globalization to Global History,”
History Workshop Journal 64 (2007): 335–340.
32 William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Kenneth Pomeranz, and Peer Vries, “Editorial,” Journal of
Global History 1, no. 1 (2006): 1.
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them, is not necessarily about taking the whole globe as the framework of analysis,
but rather involves “straddling traditional regional boundaries and proposing in-
novative comparisons.”33 In a similar vein to Geyer and Bright, the editors highlight
the inadequacy of the grand narratives of the “rise of the West” and the “West-
ernization of the rest,” and argue that historians need also to examine other cultures
and histories. At the same time, however, they seek to maintain the importance of
the Western past “in framing global contrasts and interpretations.”34 Their recog-
nition of the need to include others, then, occurs simultaneously with their desire
to maintain the Western-inspired framework within which these others are to be
located.
The arguments for global history in the short editorial are complemented by a
longer article by Patrick O’Brien that further serves as a manifesto for the new jour-
nal (and the new movement?). O’Brien, in sketching out the prospects for global
history, hopes that the metanarratives of the twenty-ﬁrst century will “leave behind
more than two millennia of historical writing designed to proclaim and validate” the
superiorities of particular civilizations, but fears that it will take longer to move on
from narratives preoccupied with “Western achievements in science, technology,
economic organization and warfare.”35 While he argues for the necessity of a cos-
mopolitan scholarship in our global times, he believes that it must be one that avoids
“the ﬁshy glue of Eurocentrism,” and he is cautious regarding the move to reclaim
indigenous ways of understanding the past for fear that such an approach leads back
“into deplorable varieties of myths supporting chauvinism and ancient ‘cen-
trisms.’ ”36 In other words, while we have to move away from “ancient centrisms,”
Western processes are to remain central, and given his arguments against critiques
of Eurocentrism or other ways of knowing the past, Western methodologies are also
to retain their central status.
The difﬁculties posed in the endeavor to write a global history without lapsing
into a “rise of the West” narrative are not faced only by historians in the West; they
are also apparent in historiographical debates located primarily in other parts of the
world. In his discussion of the world history project in China, for example, Luo Xu
writes that the ﬁrst organized attempt was made in the late 1950s, with the ﬁrst
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Patrick O’Brien, “Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of
Global History,” Journal of Global History 1, no. 1 (2006): 32. This is borne out in a rudimentary analysis
of the articles published in the new journal from the inaugural issue in 2006 to November 2009. There
were four volumes with three issues each, resulting in a total of sixty-nine articles (not including ed-
itorials, review essays, or book reviews). Of these articles, ten can be said to be based on rethinking the
standard narratives framing understandings of global history; that is, they directly challenge the simple
association of modernity with Europe and seek to provide an alternative framework within which to
conceptualize the new data. The remaining ﬁfty-nine articles maintain the narrative of European mo-
dernity subsequently globalized, or variations on this theme. In terms of topics covered, thirty—just
under half of all articles published—are on some aspect of trade, commerce, or industry; twenty-ﬁve are
on “new” historical examples or the discovery of forgotten histories; nine are on individuals in global
context; and six are on historiography.
36 Ibid., 33, 36. For a critical discussion of the possibilities of reclaiming indigenous ways of knowing
and understanding without falling into “ancient centrisms” or myths of chauvinism, see, among others,
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ed., Another Knowledge Is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies (Lon-
don, 2007); Robbie Shilliam, “Keskidee Aroha: Translation on the Colonial Stage,” Journal of Historical
Sociology 24, no. 1 (2011): 80–99.
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ofﬁcial text being published in 1962.37 This text, he suggests, followed the stages of
development as they had been universalized in Soviet historiography, and as these
had been drawn from European historical experience, the Chinese interpretation
was itself Euro-centered.38 The 1980s saw a reevaluation of the ﬁeld with attempts
made “to reconceptualize and reconstruct world history ‘with Chinese characteris-
tics,’ ” that is, to avoid Eurocentrism, but, he argues, “the reconstructed text followed
the same old way of compiling world history—Europe as the center and others as
peripheries.”39 As Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, the prevalence of “Europe” in
structuring histories elsewhere is not unusual; rather, it is “a part of a much more
profound theoretical condition under which historical knowledge is produced in the
third world.”40
ONE OF THE KEY ASPECTS of the cultural turn, and postcolonial criticism more spe-
ciﬁcally, has been the critique of Eurocentrism and grand narratives. Four different
responses from sociology and history have been considered here—third wave cul-
tural historical sociology, multiple modernities, microhistories, and global histo-
ry—to demonstrate how all four approaches work within the grand narrative of Eu-
ropean modernity as a structuring frame even when this is not explicitly
acknowledged. Third wave cultural historical sociology and microhistories, for the
most part, avoid a direct engagement with the problems associated with grand nar-
ratives generally and the aspect of their Eurocentrism more speciﬁcally. They turn
their focus instead to the micro, the cultural, and the particular. In doing this, they
allow the grand narrative of European modernity to remain in the background and
thus leave the problems associated with it untouched. The approach taken by the-
orists of multiple modernities and global historians is different, but has a similar
outcome. They acknowledge the Euro-centered nature of the previous paradigms but
seek to solve the problem by simply pluralizing within a general framework that itself
remains unchanged. The mode of deconstruction, to which these developments are
responding, enables one to ignore that which one does not wish to engage with, or
to multiply examples of otherness without requiring those examples to challenge
what had previously been thought. What is needed, instead, is a new moment of
reconstruction after the cultural turn—a moment of reconstruction that brings so-
ciology and history back together through historical sociology.
The widening remit of historical research to include cultural and postcolonial
37 Luo Xu, “Reconstructing World History in the People’s Republic of China since the 1980s,” Jour-
nal of World History 18, no. 3 (2007): 325–350.
38 Ibid., 326. See also Nicola Spakowski, “National Aspirations on aGlobal Stage: Concepts ofWorld/
Global History in Contemporary China,” Journal of Global History 4, no. 3 (2009): 475–495.
39 Xu, “Reconstructing World History,” 326–327, 338.
40 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton, N.J., 2000), 29. Indeed, some historians have argued against the very enterprise of global
history and strongly urged a renewed focus on national history as a consequence. Toyin Falola, for
example, argues that it is the weaker countries that are being asked to subsume their national histories,
their particular histories, to an overarching global history predicated on the national narratives of pow-
erful Western countries. In his account, as global history is seen as a “transitional narrative” to glo-
balization, the space for African voices is lessened. Falola, “Writing and Teaching National History in
Africa in an Era of Global History,” Africa Spectrum 40, no. 3 (2005): 499–519.
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histories has extended the data available to macrohistorians and sociologists alike.
The “newly discovered” histories, however, were not previously lost; rather, they
were associated with activities that were not seen as signiﬁcant within prevailing
accounts but cannot now be recovered as simply additional to them.41 To address
their contemporary signiﬁcance, a more thoroughgoing critique is needed, one that
goes beyond deconstruction, or a simple “expanded pluralism,” to the reconstruction
of dominant paradigms. In this sense, reinterpretations of history are not just dif-
ferent interpretations of the same facts; they also bring into being new facts. These
new facts should cause us to rethink our accepted frameworks of explanation, which
have often been established on the basis of much narrower histories. In so doing, they
also transform the meaning of preestablished facts whose status as facts (and also
for whom they are facts) is brought to light. The facts and interpretations that sup-
port standard ideas of European modernity, for example, are countered by a growing
body of literature that presents alternative interpretations and contestations of those
“facts.” The weight of such arguments is sufﬁcient to suggest that an alternative to
the grand narrative of “European modernity” is both plausible and likely to be pro-
ductive of new insights about historical and social processes. De-linking our un-
derstandings of such processes from a European trajectory and focusing on different
sources and roots and the ways these interacted and intersected over time would
provide us with richer understandings of the complexities of the world in which we
live.42
The task that postcolonial criticism asks us to consider, then, is to rethink mo-
dernity in the context of this new data and to develop paradigms adequate for a
global age in which the global is now understood as the condition of the modern
world, not its consequence. In this way, the challenge is perhaps greater to sociology
than to history, a challenge to reconstruct the conceptual architecture of the dis-
cipline and its hitherto foundational understanding of modernity.
41 See Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, 1995);
and Maghan Keita, “Africa and the Construction of a Grand Narrative in World History,” in Eckhardt
Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey, eds., Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective (New
York, 2002), 285–308.
42 Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories”; on “delinking,” see Walter D. Mignolo, “Delinking: The
Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,” Cultural Studies
21, no. 2–3 (2007): 449–451.
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